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Certification of Petitioners' Counsel
Counsel for Petitioners Higley, pursuant to Rule 35(a) of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing is presented in
good faith and not for delay.

Points of Law and Fact Overlooked or Misapprehended
l.
Wrathall's Purported Grant to Maxwell Johnson Could Convey No
Easement of any kind in the Southwest V* of the Southwest 1/4 of
Section 20,1 since No One Ever Granted Wrathall Any Interest
Therein.
Paul and Carrie Wrathall's agreement with Maxwell Johnson (the
"Wrathall-Johnson Agreement," Trial Exh. 10, reproduced at tab 3 of the Brief of
Appellants) purports to convey to Johnson an undivided one-half interest in a waterstorage easement
upon the following lands, to wit: the WA of the SE%, the E/2 of the
SWA and the SWA of the SWA of Section 20, the NWV4 of the NE1/4
and the N1/2 of the NW% of Section 29, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian . . . .
(Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, second recital (emphasis added).)

There is,

however, no evidence whatever in the record that Wrathall had any sort of easement
to convey in the SW% of the SWA of Section 20.
The grants of easement to Wrathall from Penina Anderson and from J. Keith
and Elba H. Brown create a water-storage easement upon, respectively, "[t]he
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the
1

Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake Meridian.

83144.HI321.001

1

southwest quarter of section 20, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian . . ." (Anderson Grant, Trial Exh. 7, reproduced at tab 2 of the Brief of
Appellants), and "[t]he Northwest quarter of the Northeast and the North half of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 5 West of the Salt Lake
Meridian, and the Southwest Quarter of Southeast Quarter and Southeast Quarter
of Southwest Quarter of Section 20, Township 2 South Range 5 West, Salt Lake
Meridian" (Brown Grant, Trial Exh. 7, tab 2, Brief of Appellants). (Please refer to
illustrative maps, attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
Thus, when the SW% of the SW% of Section 20 was conveyed to Arthur
Stephen and Susan M. Higley on March 2, 1990 (see Contract for Deed, Trial Exh.
9, reproduced at tab 1 of the Brief of Appellants), it was quite clearly unencumbered
by Wrathall's water-storage easements, as shown by the lack of any exception for
this in the title policy given to the Higleys (Trial Exh. 22, reproduced at tab 1 of the
Brief of Appellees). Having no easement—nor indeed any interest at all—in the
SW% of the SW% of Section 20, Wrathall could impart none to Maxwell Johnson.
"One can, after all, "only convey as much estate in land as one actually has."
Drazich v. Lasson, 964 P.2d 324, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-4 (1994)). As a result, whatever interest in the easements granted to
Wrathall may have passed to the Johnsons (if any), they have neither easement nor
interest in or upon the SW% of the SWA of Section 20.
In a word, the Johnsons lack standing to assert their claim to an easement
upon the SW% of the SW% of Section 20. Lack of standing is, of course, a
83144 HI321 001
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jurisdictional defect which may be raised by either party, or by the court, at any time.
Heath Tecna Corp. v. Sound Sys. Intl., 588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978) ("lack of
standing is jurisdictional," and may be raised sua sponte)] In re Baby K., 967 P.2d
947, 949 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting A J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co.,
817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991)) ("a lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or
either party at any time"); State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(citing State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995)) ("The Utah Supreme Court
recently held that because an illegal sentence is void, it, like issues of jurisdiction,
can be raised at any time, in any forum"). Nor may a jurisdictional defect, such as
lack of standing, be waived. See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 570 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998); State ex rel. E.G.T., 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("a
jurisdictional defect cannot be waived.").
As a matter of law, then, Russell and Peter Johnson cannot and do not hold
any sort of easement by conveyance or succession in the SW% of the SW% of
Section 20. Consequently, they may not store water thereon. This Court's Opinion
should be altered to reflect this fact.
II.
Even Assuming, Arguendo, That the Johnsons Have a Commercial
Easement in Gross, it Is Limited to the Use of the North Blue Lake
Area.
The Wrathall-Johnson Agreement recites that the reason for the assignment
was that the Wrathalls and Mr. Johnson owned rights in the waters of Fishing Creek,
a certain portion of which they desired "to store . . . in the reservoir hereinafter
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referred to and to use the water thus stored at a later time upon their respective
nearby lands . . . ." (Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, first recital.) The "reservoir
hereinafter referred to" was of course the dike and reservoir Mr. Wrathall had already
constructed long before2 (see id., second recital), impounding, when not breached,
what is now the North Blue Lake area. In keeping with this design, the Wrathalls
purported to
give and grant unto [Maxwell Johnson], his heirs, successors and
assigns, an undivided one-half interest in the easement upon said
premises, together with an undivided one-half interest in and to said
dike or dam, and an undivided one-half interest in the right and privilege
of storing water in the reservoir created by said dam, to the end that
[the Wrathalls and Mr. Johnson] shall be entitled to the benefit, use and
enjoyment of said easement and reservoir in all respects share and
share alike.
(Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, fi 6.)
Well-settled law, however, requires that the Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, like
any other contract, be read as a whole "so as to harmonize all of its provisions and
all of its terms, and all of its terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so."
Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 928 P.2d 1047,1053 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895
(Utah 1988); see also Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992) and Elm,

2

Indeed, it should be noted that the language of the Brown and Anderson
grants of easement contain identical language contemplating the construction,
repair, and maintenance of a single "said storage reservoir." This reservoir, of
course, was already in place, and, as of 1946, had been there for years.
The Wrathall-Johnson Agreement's recital that the Wrathalls had an easement
"entitling them to erect, construct and maintain . . . reservoirs or ditches" is
erroneous; Wrathall was entitled to only a single reservoir.
83144HI321001
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Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Thus, the grant
in paragraph one must be read in light of the limitation imposed by paragraph six,
which limits the interest of Maxwell Johnson to the then-existing reservoir (i.e., the
North Blue Lake):
It is understood between the parties hereto that the easements which
First Parties [Wrathalls] have include more land than is covered by the
present dike and reservoir and that this Assignment covers only the
easement in the lands upon which said dike and reservoir are
located. . .
(Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, fl 6 (emphasis added); see also Appellants' Opening
Brief at 11.) The use of the present tense ("are located") clearly restricts the
assignment to Johnson to the "said dike and reservoir" existing on May 14,1946, the
date of the Agreement's execution,3 reserving to the Wrathalls the remainder of the
land covered by the easements.
It is true that the Agreement contemplates possible enlargement of the "said
reservoir" (Wrathall-Johnson Agreement, fl 4), but of course the "said reservoir" was
the reservoir extant in 1946, now known as the North Blue Lake. The south dike and
the resulting South Blue Lake first appear in a 1952 aerial photograph, the dike
apparently having been constructed sometime after the 1950 Castagno litigation

3

At that time, the dike and reservoir consisted "of two natural ponds . . .
enlarged and improved so that they will store water; that one of said ponds is
southwest from the other and both are located in section 20." Trial Exh. 10, Finding
of Fact no. 9 at p.14 of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated Sept. 9,
1950 in Castagno & Maxwell Johnson et al. v. Paul Wrathall et ai, Dist. Ct. For
Tooele Co., Case No. See also Trial Exh. 31, a map exhibit from the 1950 litigation
showing two nearly connected ponds, both in Section 20, neither extending south
in Section 29, as the present South Blue Lake does. R. at 561, p. 774.
83144 HI321 001

5

which pitted Johnson against the Wrathalls. (See footnote 3, supra, the substance
of which appeared in the Higleys' original Brief at 6-7.)4
Thus, if the Johnsons have, in fact, received by proper conveyance a
commercial easement in gross,5 any such easement, by operation of the very
Agreement by which it was purportedly created, must necessarily be limited to the
North Blue Lake. And, indeed, Russell Johnson testified at trial that "when [water]
would come around the end of the [south] dike, it would be diverted into my father's
part of the Blue Lakes" (R. at 558, 223:15-16): what is now—or would be were the
north dike not breached—the North Blue Lake.
As was the case with the SW% of the SWA of Section 20, the Johnsons have
no standing to claim an easement by conveyance in land to which their father was
never given any right. The record is devoid of any evidence that Wrathall purported
to convey any greater interest to Maxwell Johnson than the water-storage easement
in the North Blue Lake area set forth in the 1946 Wrathall-Johnson Agreement.
III.
Johnsons' Claim to an Easement in Gross Was Improperly Raised
on Appeal, and Should Not Have Been Permitted or Considered.
A.

FOOTNOTE 2 OF THE COURT'S OPINION IS ERRONEOUS.

4

That the newer south dike, consisting of two branches (the "west dike" and
the "north dike"), did not exist in 1946, is further shown by Trial Exhibit 18, the design
plans for this new dike, signed by both Wrathall and Johnson in January of 1947,
wherein they certify that they "employed Daniel F. Lawrence of Tooele, Utah to
prepared the accompanying plans for the dam to be constructed...."
5

A point which Petitioners do not admit, for all the reasons stated in their
Reply Brief at 7-13.
83144.HI321.00l
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Footnote 2 of this Court's Opinion herein charges that
Higleys' contention that this issue is not properly before this court,
because inadequately raised below, is without merit. The pivotal
determination of the trial court is the validity of the easement conveyed
by the Johnson Deed. In determining the easement conveyed in the
Johnson Deed was valid, the trial court necessarily ruled that the
Wrathall Deeds conveyed a commercial easement in gross.
Johnson v. Higley, Case No. 981252-CA, 1999 UT App 106, at 4 n.2. The Court,
however, offers neither authority nor citation to the record in support of this
assertion, nor does it address the several authorities cited by the Higleys in arguing
that the Johnsons' easement-in-gross theory could not be raised for the first time on
appeal. (Appellants' Reply Brief at 7-8.) Petitioners Higley respectfully submit that
the Court has erred on this point. Far from "necessarily rul[ing] that the Wrathall
Deeds conveyed a commercial easement in gross," the trial court expressly ruled to
the contrary: "Plaintiffs are the sole owners of the Johnson Ranch, the water rights
used in connection with the ranch, the right to store water in the Blue Lakes
Reservoir, the ditch works connecting the reservoir to plaintiffs' lands, and all
other appurtenant facilities." (Findings of Fact, R. at 536, fl 2 (emphasis added).)
B.

THE JOHNSONS WERE BARRED FROM RAISING THE EASEMENT-IN-GROSS THEORY
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

In State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the State raised
arguments on appeal which it had not raised before the trial court, requesting that
the Court of Appeals6 "utilize the judicially created doctrine of affirming . . . on other

6

The panel consisted of Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
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proper grounds, even if raised for the first time on appeal," id. at 149, arguing that
the "'affirm on any proper ground' principle is a settled principle of appellate review,"
id. The Court, however, noted that "previous opinions on that question have been
somewhat inconsistent," id. (quoting State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355 n.3 (Utah
1996))7, and declined to affirm on the bases asserted by the State on appeal,
explaining that while an appellate court may indeed affirm on any proper ground,
previously raised or not, so long as there be evidence in the record to support such
an affirmance, the State had failed to satisfy the necessary criteria for affirmance.
These criteria were (1) apparency on the record and (2) proper briefing.
1.

Apparency on the Record.

"Critical to affirmance," said the Montoya Court, "is the requirement that the
ground or theory be 'apparent on the record,'" id. at 149:
If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time on
appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming on
any proper ground has no application. To hold otherwise would
invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on issues below, the effect

7

"We do not here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an
argument in defense of the lower court's judgment when that argument was not
presented in the lower court. We do note, however, that our previous opinions on
that question have been somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v.
UWCAssocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument raised for first
time on appeal to affirm lower court's decision); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom,
689 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah 1984) (holding that argument offered in defense of decision
below had been waived when not raised below); L&M Corp. v. Loader, 688 P.2d 448,
449-50 (Utah 1984) (refusing to address argument offered on appeal in defense of
lower court's decision where that argument was not raised in pleadings or argued by
parties below); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982)
(holding that appellate court, in affirming trial court's decision, may rely in part on a
ground not presented to trial court)."
83144 H1321 001
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of which is holding back issues that the opposition had neither notice
of nor an opportunity to address. Because of this due process
component, "apparent on the record," in this context, means more than
mere assumption or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground
or theory. The record must contain sufficient and uncontroverted
evidence supporting the ground or theory to place a person of
ordinary intelligence on notice that the prevailing party may rely
thereon on appeal.
937 P.2d at 149-50 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).
The Johnsons' easement-in-gross theory, however, turning back to the
present dispute, is not—and cannot be—"apparent on the record," since it is an
illegal argument, upon which the prevailing party may not rely on appeal.
a.

The Johnsons are judicially estopped from claiming an
easement in gross.

Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, "a person may not, to the prejudice of
another person deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the
same persons or their privies involving the same subject-matter, if such prior position
was successfully maintained." Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d
731, 734 (Utah 1995) {quoting Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 132
P.2d 388, 390 (1942)); see also Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 705 (Utah 1985)
(Durham, J., dissenting) ("judicial estoppel prevents plaintiff from seeking relief by
contradicting his own sworn statement in a judicial proceeding * * * where a party
assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that
position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume
a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the adverse party in the
original proceeding." (Quoting Chemical Bank v. Aetna Insurance Co., 417 N.Y.S.2d
83144 HI321 001

9

382, 384 (N.Y. Supp. Ct. 1979)); Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603
P.2d 793,797 (Utah 1979) (Maughn, J., dissenting) ("the doctrine of judicial estoppel
. . . does not permit a party, during the course of litigation, to assume or occupy
inconsistent and contradictory positions."); Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 829
P.2d 142, 148 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("judicial estoppel . . . seeks to prevent a
party in legal proceedings from taking a position, pursuing that position to fruition,
and later returning to attack the validity of the prior position or the outcome flowing
from it." (Citations omitted)).
Throughout the proceedings below, the Johnsons referred to their alleged
easement as an easement appurtenant. Their Verified Complaint, for example,
asserts that
Plaintiffs' real property . . . is agricultural in nature and used ofr a
livestock operation and for grazing and hay production. In connection
therewith, Russell and Peter Johnson own certain water rights . . . .
including] the right to take water from sources known as Fishing Creek
and water discharged from the Grantsville City sewer lagoons for
storage in Blue Lake Reservoir.
Plaintiffs acquired the Johnson Ranch, the easement for Blue Lake, the
ditch works and related appurtenances in 1980 upon the death of
their father and the probate of his estate.
(Verified Complaint at fflj 4 & 9, R. at 1-24 (emphasis added).) In opposition to the
Higleys' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Johnsons openly declared the
appurtenancy of their alleged easement:
. . , Russell and Peter Johnson are the sole owners of the Johnson
Ranch, which includes the exact same 192.5 acres of irrigated land that
their father, Maxwell Johnson, owned at the time he acquired a joint
interest in a right to store water in Blue Lake Reservoir from Paul
83l44.HI32l.001
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Wrathall. They inherited the ranch, including the appurtenant water,
from their father upon his death.
(Undisputed Fact No. 1, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment, R. at 307.) They further averred that "[t]he use of the Blue
Lake as an irrigation reservoir required the construction of two dikes." (Id. at fl 5,
R. at 306).
Russell Johnson, under oath, declared the easement appurtenant:
My father, Maxwell Johnson, owned all of the land known as the
Johnson Ranch prior to 1950 and, at the time of his death, together
with the water, ditch easements and Blue Lake Reservoir storage
easement This entitled him to water 192.5 acres of land.
(Affidavit of Russell Johnson at fl 4, R. at 330 (emphasis added).)

And the

Johnsons' Proposed Findings and Conclusions, requested the trial court to find a
valid appurtenant easement:
Plaintiffs are the sole owners of the Johnson Ranch, the water
rights used in connection with the ranch, the right to store water in the
Blue Lakes Reservoir, the ditch works connecting the reservoir to
plaintiffs' lands, and all other appurtenant facilities.
. . . the only ditch connected to the Wrathall-Johnson Reservoir
[the Blue Lakes] was one which carried the storage water to the
Johnson Ranch where the water had historically been used.
. . . . This storage facility provides great benefits to the Plaintiffs'
farming operations.
(Johnsons' Proposed Findings and Conclusions at fllf 2, 13, & 19, R. at 511.) The
trial court, adopting this language, so found. (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Judgment at fflj 2, 13, & 19, R. at 524-537.)
The Johnsons have thus taken a position—that their easement was
83144 HI321 001
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appurtenant—and successfully maintained it below, and now have completely
altered their argument, declaring on appeal that the easement is an easement in
gross. Indeed, their brief on appeal is as devoid of claims of appurtenancy as their
arguments below were devoid of claims in gross. Therefore, although the Court has
the power to affirm on any proper ground (assuming, arguendo, that the easementin-gross theory to be such a proper ground), it should decline to do so. The
Johnsons should not be permitted to abstain from ever raising an easement-in-gross
theory below, vehemently advocating appurtenancy, only to assert an easement in
gross on appeal. In so doing, the Johnsons (whether advisedly or not) have fallen
afoul of Montoya's due process component: they have held back a major issue which
the Higleys had neither notice nor opportunity to address except only briefly in reply
on appeal. See 937 P.2d at 149.
b.

The Johnsons have wilfully led the trial court into error and
cannot now profit therefrom.

As discussed above, the Johnsons' own Proposed Findings and Conclusions,
ultimately adopted by the trial court, declared their claimed easement an easement
appurtenant. (See Johnsons' Proposed Findings and Conclusions at fflj 2,13, & 19,
R. at 511, & Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment at fflf 2,13, & 19,
R. at 524-537.) Again, although this Court may affirm on any proper ground
supported by the record below (once more assuming the easement-in-gross theory
to be proper), the Johnsons, having lead the trial court to adopt a certain position,
cannot on appeal be heard to raise an argument completely repugnant to that earlier
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position.
[I]t is well established that a party cannot assign as error the giving of
his own requests. He cannot lead the court into error and then be heard
to complain thereof. To permit such action would needlessly prolong
litigation, so there might never be an end thereto. Having by his own
pleadings, evidence, and instruction tried and rested the case upon [a
particular] theory . . . he is bound thereby, as the law of the case. He
cannot now on appeal shift his theory and position.
Pettingill v. Perkins, 272 P.2d 185, 186-87 (Utah 1954) (citations omitted); see also
Jacobsen Constr. Co. V. Industrial Indem. Co., 657 P.2d 1325, 1330 (Utah 1983)
(Oaks, J., concurring specially) ("INA effectively acquiesced in the correctness of
Instruction 16 by taking no exception, by arguing its content to the jury, and by taking
no cross-appeal. In that circumstance, the legal definition of 'subcontractor' in that
instruction became the law of the case as far as INA is concerned, and will not be
changed to its advantage on appeal." (Citations omitted.))
Allowing the Johnsons to prevail on a theory they have openly attacked on
appeal, as the Supreme Court explained, "smacks of invited error, which is
'procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor.'" Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d
516, 520 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)).
As with judicial estoppel, the Court should decline to affirm on the basis of the
Johnsons' easement-in-gross theory since they were themselves the source of the
trial court's finding an easement appurtenant, which they now claim to be error.
(See Brief of Appellees at 18.)
2.

Thorough Briefing.

The second of the Montoya criteria for considering issues raised by an
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appellee for the first time on appeal, thorough briefing 'is most essential for an issue
raised by an appellee for the first time on appeal because the new issue has not
been addressed by the parties below and thus record support for the unaddressed
argument is critical." 937 P.2d at 150. "The reviewing court," the Montoya panel
pointed out,"... is not simply a depository in which the appealling party may dump
the burden of argument and research." Id. (Quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
450 (Utah 1988)):
the appellee still has the burden of thoroughly briefing an issue,
however recently it was raised. Under Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, which is applicable to an appellee through Rule
24(b), an appellee must provide an argument "containing the
contentions and reasons of the [appellee] with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on." When an appellee fails to comply
with this rule, we will decline to address the issue . . . .
Id. Thus, an appellee raising a new issue or argument on appeal—in this case the
Johnsons—like the appellant, must direct the Court to those parts of the record upon
which the theory relies and must include the grounds for the Court's canvassing any
theory not preserved below. Such grounds are three: plain error, exceptional
circumstances, and, in certain situations, ineffective assistance of counsel resulting
in the matter not being raised in the trial court. State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996) (multiple citations omitted).8
Johnsons' Brief of Appellees, however, asserts none of these grounds for

8

The Higleys raised this point in their Reply Brief at 7-8.
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raising the new issue of easement in gross (not even the general principle of
affirmance upon any proper ground, which the State asserted (unsuccessfuly) in
Montoya), nor do the Johnsons anywhere point to any part of the record in support
of their new easement-in-gross argument except the Anderson and Brown grants
themselves, to which they provide no citation.9 (See Brief of Appellees at 18-21.)
Under the rule laid down in Montoya, the Johnsons have failed to comply with
the

requirements

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure,

Rule

24(a)(9)—applicable to appellees through Rule 24(b)—and the Court "will decline to
address the issue."

Conclusion
For all of these reasons, Petitioners Higley respectfully request that the Court
grant them a rehearing. At a minimum, this Court should amend its opinion to clarify
that Max Johnson got only what Wrathall was able to properly give him, and no
more.
Dated this \5ft-

day of April, 1999,

John KrMang'um
Scott M. Ellsworth
Of NIELSEN & SENIOR

Attorneys for Petitioners

9

Of course, since it appears nowhere in the trial record, it is impossible to
point to any part of that record in support of the easement-in-gross argument.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 15"^ day of April, 1999, two true and correct copies of the foregoing
Petition for Rehearing were mailed by first class mail, U.S. Postage prepaid, to
Marc Wangsgard
Williams & Hunt
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
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